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Abstract—The hacktivist threat actor is listed in many risk
decision documents. Yet their tactics and techniques often remain
a mystery. We create a MITRE ATT&CK (ATT&CK) model
of a well known hacktivist who goes under the pseudonym of
Phineas Fisher, and map that threat to critical infrastructure. The
analysis is derived from hacker manifestos, journalist reporting,
and official government documentation. This analysis fills a gap in
current threat models, to better define what skills and methods
a determined hacker might employ. This paper also identifies
seven essential mitigations which can be deployed by critical
infrastructure operations and asset owners, to prevent such
intrusions by hacktivists. We are in the process of contributing
this threat actor into the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base.
Index Terms—ATT&CK, Critical Infrastructure, hacktivist
I. INTRODUCTION
State actors are widely considered to be the default threat
actors to critical infrastructure, since they are the threat most
often discussed in the media. For example, in 2017 the
malware CrashOverride [1] was found to have been used in the
2016 power outages in Ukraine, which saw the manipulation
of industrial control devices, resulting in a few hours of
downtime in a localised area. A report published in 2019
[2] suggests that their objective was to disable the whole
country’s power grid for a much longer period. While it
may make little practical difference to an operator who the
intruder is, it is good practice to have a solid comprehension
of what tactics and techniques an adversary may deploy. In
this instance, the creators had time and money to devote to the
development of a sophisticated piece of malware, specifically
designed to compromise the target. The skills and techniques
they deployed are well understood, and attacks like these are
becoming more common. However, the techniques and tactics
used by less resourced actors often go undiscussed.
State of the art literature [3], [4] does not detail the technical
threats which a hacktivist might employ, since it is hard to
attain such information without identifying and investigating
the intruder. We, therefore, perform an analysis of a well
known hacktivist who goes under the pseudonym of Phineas
Fihser (See section IV). The majority of this analysis is based
on their self-published manifestos, which break down the steps
taken to compromise their targets. This analysis is further
supported by news reporting and academic literature. Subse-
quently, we derive a MITRE ATT&CK (ATT&CK) model of
their techniques, and identify ways that an equivalently capable
hacktivist like Fisher might compromise critical infrastructure.
Based on this research, we identify seven mitigations which
may be deployed within an industrial network. This work was
motivated by a recent publication by Fisher in November 2019,
which stated ‘I will pay up to 100 thousand USD for each
filtration of this type, according to the public interest and
impact of the material...’[5], where they advocate the intrusion
into oil, gas, mining, logging and livestock companies, and
surveillance companies such as the NSO group, among others.
While we do not intend to make judgements on the political
aims of such ‘hacktivism’, based on this call to arms, and lack
of insight into hacktivist methods, it is clear there is a need
for further technical analysis.
The remainder of the paper provides a discussion on
the related work (§II), followed by an introduction of the
ATT&CK model (§III) and the Hacktivist known as Phineas
Fisher (or Phisher) (§IV). We then offer an analysis of Fisher’s
attacks (§V-A) and how this threat may be mapped to critical
infrastructure (§V-B), followed by proposed mitigations (§V-C)
and concluding remarks (§VI).
II. RELATED WORK
To date, several studies have investigated threats to critical
infrastructure and industrial control systems. One such paper,
by Rudner [6], identified several threat actors: international
terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, espionage and sabotage,
malevolent hacktivism, and insider threats. Rudner examines
the declared intentions, strategies, objectives and demonstrated
capabilities of those entities known to have threatened Critical
National Infrastructure. These threats align with the NIST SP-
800-82 Guide to industrial control system security [7] defi-
nitions, as four primary adversary actors: Individual; Group;
Organisation; and Nation-State. Yet, neither of these publica-
tions define what actions these actors may take against their
targets.
The most interesting threat, regarding our investigation, is
‘malevolent hacktivism’, which Rudner cites the United States
Department of Homeland Security warning that Anonymous
may target critical infrastructure [8] ”as part of its green energy
agenda”, which specifically supports the environmentalist cam-
paign against the Alberta Oil Sands and the proposed Keystone
XL oil pipeline. Two other groups are listed (Deep Green
Resistance and Fertile Ground), who in 2011/12 declared
an intention to target critical infrastructure. Fertile Ground
propounded1 the view that critical infrastructure is highly
vulnerable and poorly designed, so that cyber attacks striking
at key nodes could have a significant impact. As of early 2020,
the authors have been unable to find any incidents that could
be attributed to them.
While a variety of incidents have been attributed to Anony-
mous, none appear to (or have been publicly reported to)
directly affect critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, Anonymous
has claimed [9] they have access to the Stuxnet source
code, but there has been no evidence that they have used it.
Moreover, Stuxnet was designed to run on a specific site and
is not particularly useful on its own.
The human threat to critical infrastructure is discussed by
Ghafir [3], in which they propose a system to improve the
security awareness of business environment employees. Of
particular interest is Ghafir’s discussion of social engineering
and the attack strategies, suggesting the use of Kevin Mitnick’s
attack cycle, i.e. Research; Develop Trust; Exploit Trust,
and; Utilise Information. In emergencies where many disperse
departments and business partners all need to interoperate,
social engineering becomes a very valid threat to critical
infrastructure. Indeed, as reported by [10], spear-phishing is
a common entry point. Nonetheless, the security awareness
delivery method proposed by Ghafir does not appear partic-
ularly suited to application to SCADA/ICS systems, due to
the addition of ‘pop-ups’ to employees workflows along with
additional network connections.
Generally, the current body of research describes intrusions
at a very abstract level, and primarily focus on motivation and
description of the different types of threat actors. There is a
lack of detailed technical analysis of the skills a hacktivist
may employ when compromising critical infrastructure. One
might contemplate there is no difference between a hacktivist
or state actor, and since there is no publicly attributed attack to
critical infrastructure that has been performed by an individual
or group of hacktivists, one could assume they may follow the
existing intrusion trends as reported by ICS-CERT. This paper
aims to explore these assumptions.
III. MITRE ATT&CK
Released in 2015, MITRE ATT&CK (ATT&CK) [11] is
a curated knowledgebase of adversary behaviours. ATT&CK
has three main corpora consisting of pre-ATT&CK, mobile,
and enterprise. This paper considers the enterprise version
since it is designed for Microsoft Windows and Linux based
operating systems. The knowledge base consists of adversary
tactics (why) and techniques (how), that can be used by
1Based on private communication from a senior security officer in the
Canadian energy industry, January 2012 [6].
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Fig. 1. Abstraction levels of models and threat knowledge databases [12]
defenders to determine how secure their systems are. Tactics
serve as useful contextual categories for individual techniques
and cover standard notations for things adversaries do during
an operation, such as persist, discover information, move
laterally, execute files, and exfiltrate data. Techniques represent
how an adversary achieves a tactical objective by performing
an action. As detailed in [12], ATT&CK has multiple ap-
plications: Adversary Emulation; Red Teaming; Behavioural
Analytics Development; Defensive Gap Assessment; SOC
Maturity Assessment; Cyber Threat intelligence Enrichment.
This paper will use the model to analyse the threat of Fisher
to critical infrastructure, in a sense a gap assessment will be
performed based on the hacktivist threat.
Unlike other models such as Microsoft’s STRIDE [13] and
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain [14], ATT&CK is not
highly abstracted from the low level concepts, but at the same
time ATT&CK does not include low level details such as
Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs), exploits, or vulnerabilities.
Fig. 1 shows the level of abstraction between high, mid,
and low level models. The knowledge base is grounded in
observed and plausible adversary behaviours, that are likely
to be encountered rather than theoretical techniques that are
unlikely to be seen due to difficulty of use or low utility. The
behaviours described by the ATT&CK model can be encoded
into IDS systems as signatures, and are also accompanied by
potential countermeasures.
IV. PHINEAS FISHER
Phineas Fisher is a pseudonym [15], that identifies as female
[5], who has claimed and verified responsibility for many
high profile intrusions and data leaks. In 2014, Fisher targeted
Gamma Group [16]. Gamma Group sells surveillance software
to governments and police forces around the world, many of
which have been criticised by human rights organisations [17].
After releasing Gamma Group’s client list, source code, and
private details, Fisher published a step by step guide [18] on
how she compromised their systems.
One year later in 2015, Fisher compromised, then published
the details and source code for another surveillance company
called Hacking Team [19], [20], accompanied with another
write up of her methods [21].
In May 2016, she hacked the Catalan police union website
[22], defacing it, then leaked personal information of around
5,000 police officers. Fisher created a video recording of the
steps taken in the hack, which showed simple vulnerabilities
in their systems. In response to this hack, the police force
carried out raids on social centres and hacker labs2, where
they claimed they had arrested Fisher. Shortly thereafter Fisher
communicated with the media, and agreed to give an interview
to Vice News [15].
On the 19th of July 2016, Fisher compromised the Turkish
Justice and Development Party (AKP) network [23], and
was collecting data to handover to Wikileaks. While Fisher
specifically [24] told them not to release the data, this was
ignored. This hack was not accompanied by a walkthrough
guide, and subsequently, Fisher became inactive for a time
[25].
In November 2019, Fisher leaked the internal emails of the
Cayman Bank and Trust Company located on the Isle of Man
[26]. Along with this leak, she also stole a large sum of money
from the bank. This theft has been confirmed, and took place
in 2016 [27]. As with the other attacks she published a post-
mortem [5], and also offered a 100,000USD bounty to hack
banks and oil companies that could lead to the disclosure of
documents in the public interest. To this day no one appears
to have been able to identify who Phineas Fisher is, and the
Italian investigation into the Hacking Team hack was closed
without answers [28]. While there is some speculation that
Phineas Fisher might be a government operation, it is widely
believed that she is a hacktivist [29]. Fisher’s primary message
is to start a revolution of hackers, who will hack for the social
good, and target companies that are deemed ‘evil and corrupt’.
By publishing her post-mortem documents, she has shown the
simple techniques needed to break into these systems. In the
case of critical infrastructure such as Industrial Control System
(ICS), it is therefore valuable to identify how much of a threat
these systems might be from hacktivists like Phineas Fisher.
V. ANALYSIS
This section presents an analysis of Phineas Fisher’s in-
trusions, followed by a discussion of the consequent potential
threat to critical infrastructure, and possible detection methods.
A. Analysis of Fisher’s Intrusions
The MITRE ATT&CK framework currently has 266 tech-
niques in the enterprise matrix, from these techniques we have
chosen a subset which represents Phineas Fisher’s tactics and
techniques. This is based on her self-published break downs
of each attack [22], [18], [21], [5], and is presented in Table I.
The table follows the standard MITRE ATT&CK presentation
format, where the column headers describe the adversary
tactics, while the remaining cells describe the techniques
that were performed by Fisher. Each of the tactics are now
discussed in turn. Each technique is mapped back to the
source: A, Gamma Group; B, Hacking Team; C, Police Union;
D, Cayman Bank. Techniques that were not explicitly stated
are noted with an ‘I’, which denotes, ‘Inferred’ based on the
2A place for technology hobbyist and enthusiasts to meet. Not related to
illegal activities.
context. Cells with a red background are mitigated by the
countermeasures discussed in section V-C.
1) Initial Access: In all of the intrusions, initial access
was gained by exploiting internet facing applications, typically
by performing SQL injection attacks. For the Hacking Team
incident, Fisher was able to perform reverse engineering and
identify a zero-day vulnerability in their VPN appliance. It
later turned out that the appliance was also vulnerable to the
trivially performed shellshock3 vulnerability. While Fisher did
not use spear-phishing to gain access, she did refer to them in
her guides.
2) Execution: During the time of these exploits, circa 2015,
PowerShell was commonly used to perform a lot of execution
once initial access had been gained. Today, Microsoft has
deployed several mitigations against its misuse, and while
this has prevented the same methods from working, there
are a plethora of other methods to achieve the same results.
This leads on to the other techniques such as Command-Line
Interface, Scripting, Graphical User Interface, and Windows
Management Instrumentation/Windows Remote Management,
which, if enabled on this target will allow the adversary to
execute commands. All of these methods we used or discussed
by Fisher. Interestingly, these are all tools normally found in
an enterprise network, and follows the philosophy of living
off the land, which is strongly advocated in the manifestos.
3) Persistence: Persistence was often performed using web
shells that were uploaded to a compromised service. Hacking
Team was a particular exception, where she developed a
backdoored firmware for their VPN service. This firmware
included many additional tools needed for the next stages.
Fisher also maintained a redundant access service, in case
she was locked out from her primary persistence method. The
guides stated that ”I always use Duqu 2 style ‘persistence’,
executing in RAM on a couple high-uptime server” [21],
Duqu2 is a relative of Stuxnet, and performed covert, in-
memory, espionage operations [30].
4) Privilege Escalation & Credential Access: Privilege
escalation was performed by monitoring the activities of
operators, using techniques to capture user input and hijack
authenticated multi factored sessions, as well as intercepting
credentials by modifying popular services to record the plain-
text, which was the technique against the Catalonia police
union. These approaches are similar to those of state actors.
5) Defense Evasion: In most cases there were few active
defences to be evaded, since Fisher tried to maintain a RAM
only presence, e.g. exploiting services without placing mal-
ware on the disk, which may trigger alerts. When touching
the disk, Timestomping was performed, which masks the
modification dates of files changed. When impersonating a
user login, Fisher would change the logged IP and UserAgent
to match historical access logs.
6) Discovery & Lateral Movement: All of Fisher’s guides
start by discovering as much information about the target
3Shellshock could enable an attacker to cause Bash to execute arbitrary
commands and gain unauthorised access to many Internet-facing services,
such as web servers, that use Bash to process requests.
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as possible, typically involving domain and IP scanning for
services and other publicly identifiable data. This helps outline
the target, and is performed again once an initial compromise
has been done. The second time focuses on passive monitoring
of network traffic, to find additional targets. Techniques such
as LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and relay are used which allow
for lateral movement. These techniques take advantage of
broadcast messages on the network and forge a response to
the service to gain an insight into what is running on the
network.
7) Collection & Impact: Collection and Impact were
Fisher’s main ATT&CK tactics (objectives), which was
achieved via several techniques. Network file shares were
remotely accessed and downloaded locally, with the most com-
mon aims being the collection of the target’s email archive,
internal documentation, client/staff details, and source code.
For any company, this can result in a significant impact on
the day-to-day operations, and how they are perceived by the
public. As a final step, Fisher has previously taken over the
company social media account and announced to the world
they have been compromised. Although the ATT&CK model
does not have a technique for disclosing private information
as an impact tactic, it does include Defacement and Account
Access Removal.
8) Command And Control & Exfiltation: Command and
Control, and Exfiltration were performed via commonly used
port numbers and connection proxies. While Fisher would use
multiple hops and off-the-self remote access tools, and often
simple file transfers via HTTP and SSH. These approaches are
often sufficient to bypass simple IDS which are unmonitored,
as the traffic generated matches day-to-day operations (though
more bandwidth may be used, this is often not monitored).
It is noticeable that Fisher’s intrusion methods did not sig-
nificantly vary between each attack in terms of the techniques
used. While the techniques are dependant on the environment,
the skills required to perform a successful intrusion are readily
attainable.
B. Threat to Critical Infrastructure
Based on the techniques employed by Fisher, we can
deduce that a dedicated hacktivist is a valid threat to criti-
cal infrastructure. Moreover, in recent years there has been
a growing concern for climate change, which may drive
people towards targeting oil, gas, and other energy related
infrastructure in particular. Such ‘hacktivist’ threats targeting
critical infrastructure could feasibly adopt techniques similar
to those discussed above, however, the environment found
within critical infrastructure is not the same as a traditional
enterprise network, due to different underlying operations and
requirements. It is common to find older operating systems
and applications, which have been validated and certified
for specific operations. It may not be possible to update
the systems to include the most recent attack mitigations,
since that may require additional verification. For example,
many techniques make use of PowerShell, which was first
released in 2006. Since then there has been a great deal of
improvements for threat mitigation and event logging. These
improvements may not be found within critical infrastructure
systems. Moreover, there may be many old Unix systems, and
architectures, that contain exploitable vulnerabilities allowing
an adversary alternative avenues of attacks. As discovered in
our analysis, Fisher would maintain a few remote access paths
into their compromised network, to ensure that if one of the
compromised machines were detected, she would have another
entry point. Within critical networks, there are often multiple
redundant network paths providing a resilient network, and
while this is a necessity, it also provides adversaries with
alternative paths of attack.
As reported by the ICS-CERT [10], spear-phishing has
become common within operators of critical infrastructure.
While Fisher did not use this technique, it was mentioned
frequently in her manifestos. From our analysis, developing
backdoored firmware is within the capability of a hacktivist.
This is a concern for critical infrastructure networks as they
often contain many embedded devices and network appliances,
which may not be recently patched, as was seen in the Duqu
and Stuxnet intrusions.
Due to the advancement and proliferation of security con-
trols and mitigations, adversaries are having to resort to more
subtle modes of operation. As seen in the 2016 Ukrainian
power outage, and by Fisher, the adversary mimicked legit-
imate users actions to avoid detection. The motivation of a
hacktivist might be to find and leak information about the
company or to disrupt operations. Leaking information could
be a concern for manufacturing companies, which often have
trade secrets encoded into the network. Meanwhile, power
generation and transmission operators may have financial fines
imposed for service disruptions.
C. Mitigations
Based on the analysis of the tactics and techniques used
by Fisher, which could potentially be deployed by anyone
hacktivist threat actor, we now highlight seven mitigations
methods defined by the ATT&CK framework, that may be
deployed within critical infrastructure systems. The mitiga-
tions are ordered by level of deployment complexity, and
were chosen based on the number of techniques which they
mitigate:
1) Execution Prevention: Application whitelisting may be
able to prevent the running of executables masquerading
as other files.
2) Application Isolation and Sandboxing: Perform applica-
tion isolation via operating system calls, or virtualisation
and application microsegmentation to mitigate the im-
pact of a compromise.
3) Network Intrusion Prevention: Network intrusion detec-
tion and prevention systems that use network signatures
to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be
used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures
are often for unique indicators within protocols and
will be different across various malware families and
versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures
over time or construct protocols in such a way as to
avoid detection by common defensive tools. In which
case anomaly based IDS may be used.
4) Multi-factor Authentication: Integrating multi-factor au-
thentication (MFA) as part of the organisational policy
can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining
control of valid credentials that may be used for ad-
ditional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement,
and collecting information. MFA can also be used to
restrict access to cloud resources and APIs.
5) Privileged Account Management: Audit account and
group permissions to ensure that accounts used to man-
age servers do not overlap with accounts and permis-
sions of users in the internal network that could be
acquired through Credential Access and used to log into
the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the
Web server into the internal network.
6) Filter Network Traffic: Use host-based security software
to block non essential traffic e.g. LLMNR/NetBIOS.
7) Restrict File and Directory Permissions: Restrict write
access to scripts to specific administrators. Where pos-
sible perform access and execution logging.
Table I includes which of the mitigations may prevent each
techniques, by colouring the cells red and including a number
of each mitigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As far as the authors are aware this is the first academic
analysis of Phineas Fisher, and the first paper to provide a
technical analysis of the ‘hacktivist’ threat to critical infras-
tructure. We have taken a previously unknown threat actor
and identified a set of tactics and techniques which may
be used to mitigate future attacks. We are in the process
of submitting this threat actor into the MITRE ATT&CK
(ATT&CK) knowledgebase, which will be available to other
researchers and security practitioners. More broadly, research
is also needed to detect and prevent such threat actors within
the industrial control landscape.
A NOTE ON REPRODUCIBILITY
All information used in the creation of these models are
cited in the main body of the text. Since some of the man-
ifestos were difficult to ascertain we maintain a local copy4,
which includes the individual ATT&CK models as well as the
combined model discussed in this manuscript.
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